FIFA's Prediction Market Partner Reported $167 Million in Volume. Researchers Question $108 Million of It

In April 2026, FIFA appointed ADI Predictstreet as the first Official Partner in its prediction-market category. FIFA’s announcement specifically promised transparent trading, participant protection and real-time monitoring of suspicious activity.

Now the platform’s trading activity itself is under scrutiny.

According to a Wall Street Journal investigation, an analysis of public blockchain data found that roughly $108 million of ADI Predictstreet’s $167 million in total volume through late September came from cryptocurrency wallets that appeared to be linked to one another and to the platform’s infrastructure.

That is a substantial share of the reported turnover. But an important distinction must be made: the transaction analysis identifies an unusual trading structure; by itself, it does not prove that the company arranged every trade or deliberately misled users.

The overall volume is not particularly large for a prediction market, especially compared with leading platforms and the reported cost of the FIFA partnership. Trading volume is also not the same as the amount of capital deposited: the same funds can be counted repeatedly as they change hands.

What the researchers found

Three Harvard University students — Joshua Gupta, William Thompson and Ashwin Vinod Kumar — analysed the public blockchain data. The WSJ also shared their work with specialists who study unusual activity in cryptocurrency markets.

The investigation’s main figures were:

From late August, nearly all activity reportedly ran through a small network of linked accounts. A group of 795 wallets funded from one source accounted for about 99% of trading activity during the period examined.

Those wallets traded almost exclusively with one another. Their funding source was linked to a wallet that collected the platform’s trading fees.

That closed structure creates the central question: did the reported volume represent independent demand from many participants, or was a large share of the money circulating within one connected network?

What circular trading means

In an active market, trades normally occur among many independent participants. One buys because a contract looks undervalued; another sells because they hold a different view or are managing risk.

In circular trading, an asset repeatedly moves among connected accounts. The group’s economic position may barely change, but every transaction increases the displayed volume.

That activity can make a market appear to have many users, deep liquidity, constant trading and rapid adoption. Yet high volume does not mean that a customer can execute a large order at the displayed price. Order-book depth, spread, the number of independent counterparties and the persistence of volume without incentives are more useful measures of real liquidity.

Why the source of funds matters

Linked wallets are not automatically evidence of misconduct. A market maker may use several addresses to manage liquidity, risk and technical operations. A platform may also openly fund rewards or a liquidity programme.

Here, however, researchers observed several features together:

• the wallets received funds from a common source;
• they traded almost exclusively with one another;
• they generated most of the volume;
• the funding source was linked to the collection of platform fees.

Simply calling the activity market making therefore does not answer the questions. Meaningful disclosure would identify who controlled the accounts, the terms on which they received funds, the incentives involved and whether their turnover was included in public metrics without being labelled separately.

What the investigation does not prove

A public blockchain can trace funds, but it cannot always identify the legal owner of every address or the agreements among participants.

A common funding source does not by itself prove that ADI Predictstreet controlled every wallet, that every trade was fictitious, that customers suffered losses or that a specific licence condition was breached.

Gibraltar’s gambling commissioner reportedly said that an initial review found the platform compliant with rules against self-trading and found no consumer harm. ADI Predictstreet and FIFA did not respond to the journalists’ requests for comment, according to the published reports.

At this stage, it is more accurate to describe signs of inorganic activity and unresolved questions about the origin of volume than to present fraud as an established fact.

Why the FIFA partnership changes the scale

Unusual volume on an obscure crypto venue might remain an industry story. This platform was made FIFA’s first official partner in an entirely new category.

FIFA said ADI Predictstreet would operate within its integrity framework and that real-time monitoring would detect suspicious trading. The partnership also involved FIFA’s official historical data and introduced prediction markets to a global football audience.

That raises questions beyond the platform itself:

• what due diligence FIFA performed before signing the agreement;
• whether it knew how trading accounts were funded;
• how the promised participant safeguards were monitored;
• whether reporting separated organic user activity from related-party trading;
• what action is required if public volume was predominantly inorganic.

The partnership reportedly cost more than $150 million, making those questions more consequential. A major contract and official-partner status can transfer trust to a young platform before the market has tested it.

Could rewards have encouraged the volume?

Young venues often reward trading, liquidity provision or turnover to start an order book before natural demand is sufficient.

If rewards depend mainly on volume, participants may be encouraged to trade repeatedly among controlled or coordinated accounts. Fees become a cost of earning the reward, while displayed turnover rises without a comparable increase in independent liquidity.

The investigation does not establish that such a programme explains ADI Predictstreet’s activity. It does show why incentive terms should be public and the resulting volume distinguished from organic customer trading.

Blockchain transparency worked — but late

The pattern was discoverable because transactions were recorded on a public blockchain. Researchers could connect funding sources, trading addresses and fee flows without access to the platform’s internal database.

But putting a transaction on-chain does not automatically make a market fair. It creates an audit trail that someone still has to analyse. If related activity persisted for months and formed most of the volume, the natural question is why the promised monitoring did not explain it earlier.

Real transparency needs more than visible transactions. It also requires understandable participant classifications, disclosure of liquidity programmes, independent oversight and timely action when account relationships look abnormal.

Conclusion

The central issue is not whether $167 million in trading volume can technically be produced. The public blockchain shows that it can.

The real question is: how much independent market activity stands behind that number?

If $108 million came from wallets that traded almost exclusively with one another and received funds from a linked source, total volume cannot be treated as direct evidence of popularity, liquidity or user confidence.

The available data does not prove that ADI Predictstreet intentionally organised all the disputed transactions. It does demand a substantive explanation from both the platform and FIFA. The broader lesson for sports organisations is straightforward: official-partner status lends a young financial platform some of the sport’s own reputation. Due diligence must examine not only licences and technology, but who is actually creating the market.

Sources: The Wall Street Journal investigation, republished by Pechanga.net, FIFA’s official partnership announcement, and ADI Predictstreet’s Gibraltar licensing announcement.